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Abstract 
 
 Blending migration studies and labor economics, this thesis explores the 
economic implications of immigrant assimilation in Chile by using probit models to test 
for employment convergence and labor market convergence between immigrant groups 
and native Chileans. Using census data from 1992 and 2002, we find significant 
differences in the employment and labor force participation rates for these demographic 
groups, affected by the immigrants’ gender, decade of arrival, and country of origin. We 
see evidence of the nascent care industry in Chile, as well as the implications of the 
Chilean visa system and employment contracts. Additionally, we see employment 
probabilities fall for all immigrants prior to the 1993-2002 cohort, due to differences in 
demographic characteristics and potentially due to labor market discrimination as well. 
Therefore, we recommend reevaluating and updating the existing Chilean migration 
legislation to adapt to changing trends, as well as further exploring the immigrant 
experience and their economic integration in Latin American countries specifically. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In an increasingly globalized world, the study of migration patterns has become highly 
relevant across all disciplines, especially in the field of labor economics. As the 2016 
presidential election approaches in the United States, immigration reform has become a 
hot topic, and there is a growing body of literature surrounding the effects of 
immigrants—specifically of Mexican immigrants—on the domestic labor market, 
especially as seen in major U.S. cities and border states like California and Arizona. 
However, the effects of migration on labor markets have remained relatively unstudied 
in other parts of the world, specifically in developing countries. While labor and 
immigration economists have analyzed topics such as native worker displacement, the 
effects of ethnic enclaves on labor market integration, and the immigrant-native worker 
wage gap in the U.S., the economic implications of migration remain largely 
unexplored in Latin American countries with similar patterns of adjacent country 
migration. Although most of Central and South America have traditionally been 
countries of emigrants, with more natives leaving than foreigners entering, these 
migratory patterns are changing in Latin American countries like Argentina and Chile. 
Therefore, this thesis will explore the economic implications of immigrant assimilation 
in Chile by studying employment patterns to see if immigrant employment trends 
converge or not with those of native Chileans at the turn of the 21st century, using 
census data from 1992 and 2002. Moreover, we will examine the effects of racism, 
xenophobia, and sexism as well as education and intellectual capital attainment on 
economic integration as we test for employment convergence, or lack thereof.  
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 Sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and political scientists have studied a 
wide range of topics pertaining to immigration in Chile—especially in the capital city 
Santiago—such as the feminization of migration in recent years and discrimination 
rooted in xenophobia and racism. However, economists have not yet looked at how 
these trends affect the labor market in Chile specifically. In this thesis, we further 
explore questions of race and gender as they influence the economics of immigration 
among immigrants in Chile, especially Peruvian and other South American immigrants, 
through regression analysis and data comparisons across different immigrant cohorts.  
 In the past 25 years, migration in Chile has changed dramatically. In contrast to 
the mass waves of emigrants who went into exile during Pinochet’s dictatorship in the 
1970s and 1980s, the 1990s brought not only the return of democracy to Chile but also 
increased economic stability and prosperity. For this reason, Chile has begun to attract 
immigrants once again, especially from neighboring South American countries like 
Peru and Bolivia. These recent and rapid changes in migration trends make Chile a 
uniquely interesting case for analyzing the immigrant experience in a developing 
country.  
Although measured differently by different disciplines, immigrant assimilation 
undeniably affects both the labor market and other social structures and institutions. 
Those who argue in favor of immigrant assimilation cite that immigrants need to adapt 
to a new culture and potentially to a new language in order to maximize productivity 
and produce net benefits in the host society. If immigrants cannot integrate effectively 
both inside and outside the workplace, they may place a burden on welfare systems. 
Immigrants may have different pre-existing capital than a country’s native population, 
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and their skill acquisition once in the host country is also of interest for maximizing 
capital. Therefore, this thesis analyzes both U.S. economic literature surrounding 
immigrant assimilation as it pertains to economic integration as well as Chilean 
literature about immigration patterns, in addition to applying existing research models 
to Chilean data.  
 By examining existing literature on employment convergence, wage 
convergence, and U.S.-based economic assimilation studies, the subsequent literature 
review provides background and support for following theory and data analysis. 
Additionally, we discuss past and present migratory politics and policies in Chile to 
further contextualize our work, looking closely at the relatively recent surge of Peruvian 
immigrants in Chile. We then examine our economic theories in more detail before 
introducing our data set and probit models. We find significant differences in the 
employment and labor force participation rates for different demographic groups, 
affected by immigrants’ gender, decade of arrival, and country of origin, and we 
therefore make policy recommendations and recommendations for future research.  
II. Literature Review 
 
While limited literature exists regarding the economic implications of immigrant 
assimilation in Chile, ample research has discussed how immigration affects the labor 
market in the United States and other Western countries. Additionally, only a few 
studies have examined employment convergence, which analyzes employment rates of 
certain groups to see if they converge with one another over time or if gaps exist and/or 
persist. More literature exists regarding wage convergence, referring to similar 
convergence studies except for earnings rather than employment rates; therefore, our 
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review of existing literature will discuss both employment and wage convergence in 
detail. In order to fuse all of these topics coherently in subsequent sections, we will now 
examine the existing research for each of these specific areas.  
Chiswick (1978), one of the pioneering economists in the realm of immigrant 
assimilation, discovers that 10-15 years after their initial immigration to the United 
States, immigrants overtake natives in terms of wage earnings. However, Borjas (1985) 
problematizes Chiswick’s empirical analysis by studying earnings within immigrant 
cohorts instead of using a cross-section comparison. Borjas finds much slower earnings 
growth than predicted by Chiswick for most cohorts and a much later overtaking point, 
if immigrants ever manage to overtake their native-born counterparts. Borjas observes 
strong cohort effects, as newly arrived immigrants earn substantially lower wages than 
those in earlier cohorts; these cohort effects were lost in Chiswick’s cross-section 
analysis. In a later study, Borjas (2013) discovers cohort effects in not only entry-level 
wages but also the growth rate of earnings. Moreover, he observes no evidence of wage 
convergence for the immigrant cohorts arriving after the 1980s and he therefore notes a 
substantial decline in economic assimilation. 
In the realm of employment convergence, Pedace and DuBois (2012) use a 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to analyze immigrant outcomes in the United States. 
With 1994-2004 pooled cross-section CPS data, they find the native worker 
employment differential is completely due to differences in characteristics, whereas 
returns on those characteristics play a role in the immigrant employment differential. 
However, they conclude that while recent immigrants face adjustment challenges, their 
employment rates converge to those of native workers within 10 years, thus closing the 
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employment gap without—and sometimes in spite of—policy intervention. Their model 
and analysis will translate well to our study; however, our more limited sample years 
make our data less consistent and inherently less longitudinal. 
Although this study takes place in the United States and our research extends to 
the Southern Hemisphere, differences in labor market outcomes among immigrant 
groups remain relevant and interesting. For example, they found that Europeans have 
greater earnings power because of high levels of education and English language 
fluency, whereas South Americans and Mexicans have the lowest hourly wages. With 
this U.S.-based finding in mind, our paper will analyze these effects within South 
America, specifically Chile, in order to examine the hierarchy among Europeans, 
various South American immigrant groups, such as Argentines, Peruvians, and 
Colombians, as well as other immigrants from the Middle East and Eastern Asia. 
Additionally, our study will go further in its analysis of race as well as other variables 
like education and language background, among others, as we predict these variables 
will particularly affect immigrants’ experiences in Chile and their ultimate economic 
integration, or lack thereof.  
Rachel M. Freidburg (1996) finds that human capital, specifically in terms of 
education acquired domestically versus abroad, is not perfectly transferable across 
borders. She observes that language proficiency, labor market experience, and further 
education—all in the host country—help to raise returns on previously acquired 
education and skills. Her results provide a lens through which to view cohort analysis, 
leading us to predict higher employment rates and employment convergence among 
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immigrants who have been in the country longer, thus allowing them to gain more 
experience, education, and language skills if necessary. 
Borjas (2003) argues that education and work experience must both be 
considered when analyzing whether or not immigration influences employment 
opportunities of native workers. Building on the assumption that workers are imperfect 
substitutes for each other and breaking down skill groups into educational levels and 
prior work experience, Borjas observes that immigration has negatively impacted the 
labor market opportunities for many native workers by dramatically shifting the supply 
curve. However, he acknowledges the need for further studies that incorporate the 
benefits of immigrants on their host communities, and his study can be replicated in 
other areas of the world.  
Blau et al. (2008) analyze labor market characteristics as they pertain 
specifically to gender in both the source and host countries. They discover that women 
migrating from countries with high female labor market participation rates have greater 
participation rates in the host country’s labor market as well. However, rates of male 
labor market participation do not affect immigrant men’s propensity to seek and find 
employment. These findings are made even more interesting when considering the 
recent feminization of migration, especially in Latin America.    
Carolina Stefoni Espinoza (2002) provides a framework with which to analyze 
these distinctly Chilean differences in terms of migratory trends, and she calls for a new 
migratory policy in Chile that allows for real integration of foreigners into Chilean 
society. Although she does not delve into specific policy recommendations, she argues 
that mass media and popular reactions that enforce negative stereotypes limit 
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immigrants in their integration on all fronts, especially socially and economically. Chile 
has recently begun to attract immigrants because of its relatively stable economy in 
comparison with other Latin American countries, combined with recent border closures 
and stricter immigration policies in more typical migration destinations, such as the 
United States and Western Europe. In 1992, 34.4% of all immigrants in Chile are from 
Argentina—up from 19.7% ten years earlier—whereas only 7.6% of total immigrants 
were Peruvian. Although those numbers have changed significantly in recent years as 
Peruvian immigration has increased while Argentine trends have remained mostly 
constant, Peruvians remain hyper-visible while their Argentine counterparts are 
cordially ignored. Despite the greater gross percentage and rate of growth for Argentine 
immigrants in Chile, factors like race, education, accent, positive stereotypes, and other 
similarities work to disguise Argentine migration and overemphasize the Peruvian 
differences.  
Stefoni Espinoza notes that labor data analysis is sorely lacking for immigrants 
in Chile specifically, as compared to available data for Western countries. Furthermore, 
studying gender as it pertains to economic integration and labor market outcomes has 
been largely ignored in previous economic analyses of immigration, even though the 
feminization of migration has become increasingly prevalent and important in labor 
economics as it pertains to immigration specifically. Therefore, we will further 
investigate potential race and gender differences, especially for Peruvians and other 
South American immigrants in Chile, comparing different countries of origin. While 
neither our data set nor Stefoni Espinoza’s work captures the full scope of current 
Peruvian immigration, this data analysis remains necessary to contextualize Chile’s 
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current migration politics. Argentina and Chile have a much more reciprocal 
relationship, especially in terms of migration. However, migration from other South 
American countries, especially Peru and Bolivia, is more one-sided and therefore those 
immigrants may be prone to more discrimination and assimilation difficulties in Chile. 
Moreover, we predict that employment outcomes will look quite different for male and 
female immigrants in Chile, due to traditional gender norms that dictate job choices and 
assimilation possibilities. 
Employment comparisons are important because wage comparisons can only 
come after workers have received employment in the first place. We need more studies 
that focus on employment convergence before and in addition to looking at wage 
convergence, because while immigrant wages may converge with those of natives, their 
employment opportunities may be dramatically different because of different rates of 
acquiring employment in the first place. Used together with wage convergence 
information, employment convergence studies can provide a more complete analysis of 
immigrant assimilation. 
III. History of Migration and Migration Policy in Chile 
 
Sandwiched between the Andes Mountains and the Pacific Ocean and extending from 
the border with Peru to the southern tip of South America, Chile has a unique 
geography that has shaped its migratory histories. Chile’s migratory politics began with 
selective migration through a government sanctioned blanqueamiento, or “whitening”, 
in which the Chilean government established a migratory agency in Germany in 1882 to 
attract Western European settlers. This policy, implemented in the mid- to late- 1800s, 
encouraged European immigration to Southern Chile by offering large land tracts as 
 	 9 
incentives to these European settlers. By the 
beginning of the 20th century, German immigrants 
had established small colonies in Valdivia (near 
Puerto Montt), and Eastern European immigrants 
from former Yugoslavia created communities at 
the northern and southern extremes of the country 
in Antofagasta and Punta Arenas. This European 
presence is still evident in architecture, breweries, 
and local customs, but more notably, it remains 
present in the general effects of the 
blanqueamiento on the Chilean population. Chile 
continues to have one of the “whiter” populations 
in South America due to the small yet historic 
European presence, attracted by land tracts that 
were taken from the native Mapuche people in 
order to more forcibly change Chile’s racial composition. Arab immigrants from 
Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon began to arrive in the mid-20th century, fleeing conflict in 
the former Ottoman Empire. Due to racial differences, however, these Arab immigrants 
did not receive the same warm welcome as the Europeans, and many faced racial 
discrimination from Chileans.  
 However, the military coup that overthrew President Salvador Allende and 
installed General Augusto Pinochet in 1973 changed migration patterns in Chile, 
leading to mass emigration as liberal Chileans went into exile, primarily fleeing to 
Figure 1: Map of Chile 
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Canada, the United States, Sweden, and Argentina. While existing emigrant statistics 
are only rough estimates because of Pinochet’s organized silencing, scholars estimate 
that 200,000 to 1,000,000 Chileans left in either forced or voluntary exile during the 
dictatorship. Additionally, the brutality of Pinochet’s rule obviously discouraged most 
immigration. In 1982, only 84,000 immigrants were recorded in Chile, a record low for 
the country and only 0.75% of its total population. After Pinochet’s regime came to an 
end in the late 1980s, officially ending in 1990, many exiled Chileans returned to their 
native country, but many continued to live abroad and still have not returned to Chile. 
Decades after Pinochet’s dictatorship, his 1975 Immigration Act continues to govern 
migration laws in Chile through strict visa criteria and harsh contract laws for 
immigrants seeking work. 
 Despite this rapid recent growth, Chile still does not have much formalized 
migration legislation, due to its long history as an emigrant-sending country and its 
geographic isolation. The laws in place are extremely outdated; the most comprehensive 
legislation on migration was ratified in 1975 under Pinochet’s dictatorship. The 1975 
Immigration Act became the cornerstone of Pinochet’s migration policy, put into place 
to strengthen national security. This legislation began Chile’s strict visa policy, which 
requires all foreigners to obtain a tourist, resident, or permanent visa to remain in the 
country. Resident visa categories include student, temporary, contract, official, and 
refugee, even though the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
only estimated 1,900 refugees and asylum-seekers in Chile in 2010. While contract 
visas must be sponsored by an employer, temporary visas are given more freely to those 
the country views as “beneficial”, such as scientists and businessmen, usually of 
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European or North American origin. These separate but similar categories provided 
Pinochet’s government a loophole to entice predominantly white and wealthy 
immigrants to come to Chile while discouraging other immigrant groups through 
otherwise strict migration legislation. Under this law, no migrant-specific category 
exists. 
 Although the Chilean government has proposed legislative changes and 
additions to its migration policy since 1975, these proposed changes—very few of 
which have actually been approved and implemented—are small in scale and lack the 
comprehensiveness to override the former Pinochet legislation. This absence of formal 
legislation is surprising, yet it is largely due to Chilean indifference and a long history 
of emigration when compared to this relatively recent immigration trend. Chileans’ lack 
of knowledge surrounding national immigration policy and their stereotypical 
intolerance towards immigrants—especially those from poorer South American 
countries—creates a vicious cycle of misrepresentation in the media, which in turn fuels 
Chilean intolerance and discriminatory attitudes. As a result of their legacy of 
blanqueamiento, Chileans harbor racism—in addition to xenophobia—towards brown 
and black people, despite their own indigenous Mapuche roots. This racism and 
xenophobia manifests itself strongly against Peruvian immigrants because of their 
stronger presence in Chile relative to other South American immigrant groups, such as 
Bolivians and Ecuadorians with similar skin tones and indigenous phenotypes. 
Moreover, racist undertones and overtones in Chilean society explains their symbiotic 
migratory relationship with Argentina, a quasi-European and uncharacteristically pale-
skinned country for South America. The media bias, as well as racist and xenophobic 
 	 12 
attitudes, fuel Chileans’ apathy toward changing the dictatorial legislation of 1975, 
which is discriminatory, overly conservative, and geared toward increasing European 
and North American migration while keeping all South American immigrants—other 
than Argentinians—out of the country.  
 The current Chilean president Michelle Bachelet has yet to conclusively change 
anything either, despite talk of greater “inclusion, regional integration, and rights”. In 
2013, a bill came before the Chilean congress to update the 1975 Immigration Act; 
however, its changes were not comprehensive, including only small legal additions like 
a new visa category for seasonal workers and requiring foreigners to obtain a work visa 
before their arrival. In 2007, Bachelet instated a general amnesty for foreigners living in 
Chile, issued to combat the abuse of undocumented workers on a national scale and to 
improve international relations with neighboring countries. The amnesty benefited 
50,000 immigrants overall, including 32,000 Peruvians. Apart from these recent 
developments, discourse regarding changing migration policy has been largely absent in 
Chile. Additionally, the lack of a cohesive and comprehensive economic development 
plan makes shaping policy and responding to migration trends more difficult. Bachelet’s 
administration has tried to emphasize the human development of migrants over their 
economic development, meaning that she has placed a greater emphasis on immigrants’ 
wellbeing and social integration and less on their economic participation, as the more 
conservative governments of Pinochet and Piñera did. However, these words have yet to 
come to fruition. While a national Migration Policy Council has technically existed 
since 1975, its membership has never been officially implemented or constituted. 
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 The 1975 Immigration Act continues to have lasting repercussions for Chile. 
Due to Pinochet’s dictatorship, Chile continued to be a country of emigrants even after 
the return of democracy. In 1998, 860,000 Chileans—7% of the total population—were 
estimated to be living outside of Chile, whereas immigrants in Chile comprised 1.22% 
of the total population. This data clearly establishes Chile as a country of emigrants and 
therefore, any studies of migration in Chile will look different and have different 
implications than for example, U.S.-based studies because of the countries’ distinct 
positionalities in relation to migration politics, with the U.S. as a historically and 
predominantly immigrant-receiving country. However, more recent data from the 
OECD International Migration Outlook (2012) shows that 370,000 foreign-born persons 
were living in Chile in 2010, which is nearly twice the number of immigrants registered 
in 2002. Thus, migration patterns are obviously shifting.  
 As previously mentioned, most immigrants living in Chile are from other South 
American countries, with the majority coming from the neighboring countries of Peru, 
Argentina, and Bolivia. As seen in Figure 2, Peru has recently replaced Argentina as the 
main country of origin; between 2002 and 2009, the number of immigrants from Peru 
has more than tripled, growing from 37,860 in 2002 to 130,859 in 2009. Data from 
2012 estimates that Peruvians now account for 37% of the immigrant population in 
Chile, followed by Argentines (17%), Bolivians (6%), Ecuadorians (5%), and 
Colombians (4%). While these current numbers are not reflected in our data set, this 
rapid growth of migration in Chile remains important when analyzing past data and 
predicting trends. Figure 2 also shows that Bolivian migration more than doubled 
between 2002 and 2009, growing from 10,919 to 24,116, and Ecuadorian immigrants 
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doubled from 9,393 in 2002 to 19,089 in 2009 as well. Additionally, Colombian 
migration tripled in that same period, from 4,095 immigrants in Chile in 2002 to 12,929 
in 2009. 
Bolivians, 
Ecuadorians, 
and Colombians 
face similar 
discrimination 
and difficulties 
in Chile as 
Peruvians do; 
however, the 
sheer number of Peruvian immigrants in Chile now makes them an important individual 
focus and valuable predictor of employment patterns, assimilation, and general 
wellbeing for other immigrant groups as well. 
IV. Peruvian Migration 
  
Peruvian migration has become an especially important recent trend, one that our data 
set only begins to capture. The influx of Peruvian immigrants in Chile represents the 
most recent demographic change in Chilean migration patterns, but since Peruvian 
immigration had just begun to intensify at the turn of the 21st century, our data set does 
not accurately capture its effects on current policies and society. Therefore, we rely on 
more recent sociological, political, and anthropological research to fill the gap between 
Figure 2: Immigrant Stock and Percentage Growth in Chile (1982-2009) 
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2002—the latest year of available Chilean IPUMS census data—and present-day 
(2016).  
 Especially notable in this most recent wave is the feminization of migration. 
Table 1, as seen below, shows the total number and percentages of female immigrants 
from various countries of origin in Chile in 2009: 
Table 1: Stock of Female Immigrants from Various Countries of Origin in Chile (2009) 
Country Female, Total 
Female, % of 
immigrants from 
specific country 
Peru 74,314 56.79 
Argentina 30,080 49.64 
Bolivia 12,994 53.88 
Ecuador 10,504 55.03 
Colombia 7,559 58.47 
Spain 5,192 47.09 
United States 4,398 45.25 
Brazil 5,285 54.91 
Other countries 35,993 48.92 
Total 186,319 52.88 
 
Countries like Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Colombia show an increasing 
feminization of migration, with females migrating at a higher rate than the expected 
50% for equal gender migration. Countries like Spain, the United States, and Argentina 
show a more even split or less female migration. These trends show that women tend to 
migrate to Chile more from economically unstable countries, due to Chile’s economic 
and political stability as well as its geographic proximity. Women may be forced to 
migrate to make money for their families and send back remittances, especially if they 
are single mothers or if their husbands have already migrated in search of work.  
 The budding care industry also provides more opportunity for female workers 
abroad as domestic caretakers. More developed economies demand domestic workers 
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and caretakers for both young children and elderly relatives as Chilean women are now 
entering the workforce in greater numbers, and struggling economies have begun to 
supply these domestic workers and caretakers in greater abundance. When accounting 
for the total volume of immigrants and not just percentages, Peruvian women especially 
are migrating in unprecedented numbers, with 74,314 Peruvian women in Chile in 
2009, thus dominating Chile’s care industry along with that of countries like Argentina 
and Spain as well. They choose to immigrate to Chile, Argentina, and Spain in search of 
higher wages through participation in the care industry, and many Peruvians end up in 
Chile due to its geographic proximity. Chile’s economy has only become stronger in 
relatively recent years, beginning to grow again after the return of democracy in 1990. 
Immigrant women with university degrees from poorer countries are working far below 
their education and skill levels as domestic caretakers in Chile. Peruvian immigrants 
tend to be highly educated, many coming to Chile with university degrees. However, 
due to job availability, discrimination, and desperation, Peruvian women accept 
caretaking jobs and men accept janitorial positions, despite having worked as professors 
or in other more esteemed professions in their native country. Moreover, the emigration 
of Peruvian women from Peru to relatively wealthier countries creates a cycle of care, 
as the emigrating woman relies on local relatives to care for her own family while she 
cares for another family in another country. 
 Furthermore, many immigrant workers in the care industry are undocumented; 
the personal and intimate nature of the work forgoes government involvement and 
makes direct contracting the most common employment practice. However, difficult 
visa processes and strict contract systems can bind workers to abusive and exploitative 
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employers either directly, through formal contracts and legal documents, or indirectly, 
through threats of deportation. Moreover, due to their precarious immigration status on 
temporary work visas, Peruvian women in the care industry do not have the power to 
negotiate their salaries and working conditions. Despite amnesty programs in recent 
years to promote regularization, many Peruvian women continue to migrate illegally 
due to high regularization costs and the fear of deportation for coming forward as 
undocumented in the first place. Terminating the contract immediately terminates the 
corresponding visa, leaving the immigrant without work and without legal 
documentation. If a worker loses his/her job or quits, he/she only has 30 days to find a 
new job, receive a new contract, and get government approval and notarization before 
facing deportation. 
 The current number of immigrants in Chile and the country’s immigrant to 
emigrant ratio may not seem particularly noteworthy on a global scale. Chile’s 
migratory patterns have only recently altered in the 1990s to make it a country receiving 
more immigrants than sending emigrants, but its emigrant stock still remains higher 
than its immigrant stock. Thus, the national media’s emphasis on immigrants in Chile 
makes the national percentage appear much higher and more extreme than it actually is. 
A 2007 survey by Latinobarómetro exposed discriminatory and xenophobic attitudes in 
Chile when it revealed the country to be the “third most immigrant-averse country” in 
Latin America, after Costa Rica and Ecuador, making it one of the least open countries 
to receiving immigrants. Only 35% of Chileans surveyed agreed that immigrants should 
have the same rights as native Chileans. These discriminatory attitudes ignore the high 
number of Argentinian immigrants in Chile—over 60,000 in 2009 (Figure 2)—because 
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the two countries have a more reciprocal migratory relationship. Additionally, while the 
Peruvian population began to dramatically increase in Santiago, Peruvians had already 
normalized their presence in Chile’s northern regions of Tarapacá and Antofagasta 
decades ago, due to the regions’ proximity to the Peruvian border. Therefore, much of 
the media hype is attributable to the new centrality of the immigrants rather than their 
sheer numbers. That being said, Chile has experienced unprecedented migration in 
recent years. After 1992, Chile’s immigrant population grew by over one third, and in 
2002 its migration department recorded the highest absolute number of immigrants in 
the country’s history. Thus, Chile needs an updated and holistic migration policy to 
adequately respond to these changing patterns and demographics. 
V. Theory 
 
In light of changing migration patterns in Chile, the extent of immigrant assimilation 
raises important policy questions for countries with growing rates of immigration. 
Varying degrees of completeness in terms of immigrant assimilation can impact the 
labor market and other social structures, and this incompleteness is often due to 
variations in human capital levels as well as structural and social differences. 
Furthermore, race and ethnicity can greatly impact assimilation both socially and 
economically, and much of this racial or ethnic variation can result in double 
discrimination through the combination of xenophobia and racism. Additionally, 
darker-skinned women immigrants often face triple discrimination, resulting from being 
a minority across three different identities. On the contrary, Western European or North 
American—specifically U.S. American and Canadian—immigrants may assimilate 
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more easily as a result of more privileged educational and ethnic backgrounds as valued 
by the host country.  
In order to analyze immigrant assimilation, economists often look at wage 
convergence. We study employment convergence far less often; however, these two 
should be analyzed in tandem. Employment convergence provides a means of empirical 
analysis regarding the extent of immigrant assimilation in that it highlights who gets 
into the labor market in the first place. Wage convergence studies can only reveal 
convergence among labor market participants; however, employment convergence 
captures unemployment and inactivity, allowing us to analyze labor market entry and 
stability. Moreover, both employment convergence and wage convergence analyses 
allow us to isolate different immigrant groups, which will be of interest if racism and 
xenophobia both have effects, as predicted. This research will not only analyze 
immigrant assimilation as a whole through an examination of employment assimilation 
but also provide group-specific analyses within the broader immigrant category.  
Examining employment assimilation through regression analysis allows us to 
observe the effects of specific variables on employment and labor force participation 
rates, such as educational attainment, age, gender, number of children and their ages, 
decade of arrival to Chile, race, and ethnicity, among others. Using two probit models, 
one with employment as our dependent (y) variable and the other with labor force 
participation, we can use our specifications to predict employment for a worker with 
certain characteristics, such as level of education, job type, country of origin, and other 
demographic characteristics. By including dummy variables for immigrant cohorts, we 
can isolate their effects and their magnitudes to better observe how different factors 
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affect employment for immigrants as opposed to native Chileans. For example, we 
predict that educational attainment and work experience will be positive and significant 
factors in terms of obtaining employment for all labor force participants, but these 
variables may have different magnitudes for different groups, both natives as compared 
to immigrants as well as across immigrant cohorts. We hypothesize that employment 
trends look different across different immigrant groups, with older cohorts, Europeans 
and other lighter-skinned immigrants, and men faring better in terms of labor force 
participation and employment convergence than more recent immigrants, other South 
Americans excluding Argentina, and women.  
VI. Data 
Our study uses pooled cross-sectional Chilean census data as the basis of our analysis. 
The primary data source for this study is the the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, 
International. IPUMS International compiles census data from various countries for 
social and economic research purposes, and the Minnesota Population Center, National 
Statistical Offices, and other international data archives have all collaborated on this 
project. Specifically, our data comes from the most recent Chilean censuses in 1992 and 
2002—2012 data is not yet available—in order to analyze immigration patterns after the 
Chilean dictatorship, which lasted from 1973 to 1990. While we would like to compare 
migration patterns and groups across more recent time periods, the available data is 
limited and thus we must constrain our analysis within the scope of available and 
accessible data. Individual or household level wage data is not available either, likely 
due to the prevalence of tax evasion in many Latin American countries; if asked about 
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income data, the participants may not respond to the survey questions at all. Therefore, 
our study will discuss employment convergence exclusively.  
The data set, combining 1992 and 2002 census data, contains 1,885,532 
observations total. Of these, 1,827,031 are native Chileans and 21,276 are immigrants 
(37,225 are unknown/missing), which means only 1.13% of our sample population are 
foreign-born. We notice a significant increase in the annual immigration numbers after 
1988. This result makes sense historically, since the 1988 Chilean national plebiscite 
ended Pinochet’s military rule and the country officially returned to a democracy in 
1990. Of the immigrants surveyed, 9,323 people immigrated over 10 years ago while 
1,639 immigrated within the past year. In each of these categories, 6,449 people—
0.34% of the total sample—did not complete all of the necessary survey questions for 
our analysis and are therefore not included in our immigrant-specific analysis. Variables 
of interest are age, sex, educational attainment, detailed employment status, class of 
worker, and occupation. Variables like country of origin will become important in 
cross-group comparisons between different immigrant cohorts, and we created dummy 
variables for immigrant cohorts to capture differences in year of arrival. We have four 
cohort variables for the decades 1993-2002, 1983-1992, 1973-1982, and those arriving 
in 1972 or before, which we use as the base group and thus do not include as a variable 
in the regressions.  
 The legal working age in Chile was age 14 in 1992 and age 15 in 2002, and the 
retirement age is 60 and 65 for women and men, respectively. Therefore, we have 
dropped observations outside of these age ranges. A more detailed description of 
employment status captures this information more thoroughly by expanding the 
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categories of “employed”, “unemployed”, and “inactive” to include factors like 
disabilities, retirement, and housework in their own home. Overall, the data contains 
1,018,956 labor force participants, and of the labor force participants, 901,830 are 
employed and 117,126 are unemployed.  
Immigrants in Chile have a slightly higher employment rate and slightly lower 
unemployment rate than their Chilean counterparts. These findings make sense, since 
many immigrants migrate in search of work. Immigrants also have a lower percentage 
of the population that is not in the labor force, which also makes sense; often, only one 
parent migrates to a new country and the other stays with the children in their native 
country, and elderly or retired people may return to their native country when they are 
no longer working. The following table compares education attainment levels between 
immigrants and native Chileans. It shows percentages obtained with the “education 
attainment” variable and the immigrant cohort dummy variables: 
Table 2: Education Attainment Cohort Comparisons 
 Less than 
primary 
completed (%) 
Primary 
completed 
(%) 
Secondary 
completed 
(%) 
University 
completed(%) 
Native 
Chilean 
(N=1,827,031) 16.33 48.28 31.39 4.00 
Cohort 1993-
2002 
(N=7,206) 4.48 22.55 56.31 16.65 
Cohort 1983-
1992 
(N=4,362) 3.99 32.78 49.22 14.01 
Cohort 1973-
1982 
(N=2,233) 3.81 33.86 47.65 14.69 
Cohort pre-
1973 
(N=4,647) 13.94 37.81 36.75 11.49 
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This data shows that native Chileans are more likely to have only completed primary 
education or have completed less than primary education while immigrants as a whole 
are much more likely to have secondary or university degrees. These preliminary results 
are of interest for later regressions, since prior research has considered human capital 
attainment to be an important deciding factor in employment convergence. Immigrants 
are overwhelmingly more likely to be high school and university graduates, seen 
especially in the more recent cohorts. In our probit regressions, we use those with less 
than primary education completed as the base group. 
Another variable of interest is sex, and while this variable may prove more 
important among different immigrant cohorts, the following table shows that the gender 
distribution between males and females for natives and immigrants: 
Table 3: Gender Breakdown Comparison between Immigrants and Native Chileans 
 Male (%) Female (%) 
Immigrant 49.36 50.64 
Native Chilean 48.65 51.35 
 
We observe a nearly 50%/50% gender breakdown, with almost equal percentages for 
both native Chileans and immigrants. This result is interesting because males have 
historically dominated migration patterns as the traditional breadwinners, so we may 
expect the immigrant percentages especially to be more skewed. However, within the 
last few decades, the feminization of migration has become increasingly prevalent, 
especially in Latin America. While this trend has continued in recent years, this data 
shows that the feminization of migration had already begun by 2002. Chile specifically 
has received more Latin American women in recent years who immigrate to become 
maids and nannies for Chilean families.  
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 The table below contains summary statistics for our most important regression 
variables: 
Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variables 
Immigrants 
(N=21,276) 
Native Chileans 
(N=1,827,031) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Employed .9176 .2750 .8824 .3221 
Labor force participation .5630 .4960 .5367 .4987 
Age 34.3503 13.6160 35.2094 13.7384 
Marital status 1.6551 .6291 1.7191 .6533 
Young child (ages 0-5) .1713 .3768 .2180 .4129 
Primary completed .2891 .4534 .4706 .4991 
Secondary completed .4983 .5000 .3139 .4641 
University completed .1497 .3568 .0400 .1959 
Occupation: Management .0783 .2685 .0278 .1645 
Occupation: Professionals .1121 .3155 .0417 .1999 
Occupation: Technicians .0661 .2484 .0513 .2206 
Occupation: Clerks .0393 .1943 .0535 .2251 
Occupation: Service 
sector .0619 .2409 .0612 .2397 
Occupation: 
Agriculture/Fish (Skilled) .0120 .1088 .0436 .2043 
Occupation: 
Crafts/Tradesmen .0418 .2001 .0779 .2680 
Occupation: Factory .0264 .1602 .0454 .2081 
Elementary Occupations .0974 .2964 .1093 .3120 
 
These means and standard deviations, run separately for immigrants and native 
Chileans, further illustrate our preliminary results. For example, immigrants have a 
much higher mean value for university education completed, but they also have a larger 
standard deviation. We also see a slightly higher employed mean with a smaller 
standard deviation. Those in elementary occupations, which are low-skill jobs, comprise 
our occupation base group. In addition to the variables listed in Table 4, we created 
dummy variables for the most common countries of origin for immigrants in Chile, 
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which are Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, the United States, Spain, and Germany. 
We also created a dummy to capture all other Latin American countries and all other 
European countries, with our reference group being all other countries not included in 
the aforementioned dummies. 
VII. Model 
Our initial model was the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model: 
 
Y= β0 + β1X + β2X+... βkX 
However, our dependent variables are employment status and labor force 
participation, which makes the OLS model insufficient. It does not guarantee that the 
predicted probabilities will fall within the [0,1] interval, which means that the OLS 
model may not always have predictive value. We ran preliminary OLS regressions 
using Stata, but as predicted, the OLS regression model yielded extremely low R2 
values and high collinearity between variables. The age and age squared variables were 
extremely collinear with other variables, with a variance inflation factor (VIF) of 32.49 
and 32.04, respectively. Age collinearity is likely due to age’s impact on almost all 
variables of interest, such as education, occupation, marital status, and children. The 
education dummies were also collinear, with VIFs ranging from 3 to 5. Moreover, we 
had to drop the educational attainment in Chile variable due to collinearity as well. 
However, capturing country specific educational attainment is important in thinking of 
education as a signal of productivity and human capital. Signals are more effective 
when they are well understood, and thus education specific to the host country may 
have a greater positive impact on employment than education obtained elsewhere. In 
another regression that included occupation dummies as well as education dummies, 
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cohort dummies, marital status, and children for the four different groups—native 
males, native females, immigrant males, and immigrant females—we found extremely 
high VIFs for most of the occupation variables, ranging from 2 to 48. We expected 
collinearity to be a major problem in standard multiple regression analysis and thus will 
focus exclusively on our probit regression results.  
 Therefore, we used probit specifications to constrain the predicted probabilities 
to the interval [0,1]. The probit model is based on the standard normal cumulative 
density function (CDF), and in the probit model, 
the standard normal CDF replaces the linear 
function. This replacement means that the beta 
terms are not estimated with OLS but rather 
through maximum likelihood (ML). Therefore, for 
any given x, the probit model provides the Z 
value.  
 We have converted the probit coefficients to show each variable’s marginal 
effects. By taking the derivative and finding the discrete change in the dependent 
dummy variable from 0 to 1, we can interpret the coefficients as we would interpret 
OLS beta coefficients, as percent changes in probability. We ran 8 separate probit 
regressions in two distinct sets, one with “employed” as the binary dependent dummy 
variable and another with “in the labor force” as the dependent variable. For each of 
these, the reference group is “unemployed” and “not in the labor force”, respectively. 
Additionally, we ran separate regressions that include countries of origin as independent 
Figure 3: Probit and logit models as 
compared with the linear probability 
model (LPM), also known as OLS 
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variables to analyze more country-specific effects on employment outcomes. Our probit 
equations are as follows: 
1) Pr(y=1) = F(X)   If female==0 
2) Pr(y=1) = F(X)  If female==1 
3) Pr(y=1) = F(X,λ )  If female==0 
4) Pr(y=1) = F(X,λ )  If female==1 
where y is employment for Regressions 1-4 and labor force participation for 
Regressions 5-8, and F(X), F(X,λ ) is the value of the standard normal cumulative 
density. X is a vector that includes age, marital status, and various dummy variables: 
young child ages 0-5, primary education completed, secondary education completed, 
university education completed, immigrant cohort 1993-2002, cohort 1983-1992, and 
cohort 1973-1982. A separate set of regressions, specified by F(X,λ ), includes the 
aforementioned variables in X, as well as country of origin dummy variables for Peru, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, the United States, Spain, Germany, other Latin American 
countries, and other European countries in λ .  
VIII. Results 
As previously mentioned, we generated dummy variables in Stata to represent 
immigrant cohorts, defined by decade of arrival, and our current results combine 1992 
and 2002 data. The following table shows the unemployment rate for each cohort 
compared with the total unemployment rate for both native Chileans and immigrants as 
a whole: 
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Table 5: Unemployment Rate Cohort Comparisons 
 Unemployment rates (%) 
Native Chileans 11.76 
Immigrants (pooled) 8.24 
Cohort 1993-2002 8.27 
Cohort 1983-1992 10.09 
Cohort 1973-1982 10.45 
Cohort pre-1973 6.69 
 
These results, although preliminary, show lower unemployment rates for all cohorts as 
compared to their native Chilean counterparts, with the unemployment rate for native 
Chileans at 11.76% across our census years. While it may seem surprising that even the 
most recent immigrants have a low unemployment rate, Chilean migration policy 
requires many immigrants to already have a job contract before migrating, thus ensuring 
employment. The contract process in Chile is especially prevalent for temporary and 
seasonal jobs, as well as domestic work. These preliminary calculations show that 
immigrants may have better employment prospect trends than native Chileans, due to 
these migration policies and requirements. However, these results do not account for 
type of employment or employment preferences. For instance, many new immigrants 
provide seasonal labor, which differs from other industry jobs in that it can be less 
stable and less predictable. Moreover, immigrants may be working part-time when they 
would like to work full-time, or they may be working below their qualifications, and our 
results cannot account for these various differences in individual preferences. Although 
the unemployment rate appears to be smaller, immigrants may not necessarily be better 
off.   
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A. Regressions 1-2 (Table 6) 
 We ran 8 separate probit regressions, with different regressions for males and 
females and with two distinct binary dependent variables to analyze employment as 
well as labor force participation. Regressions 1-2 predict employment probabilities for 
men and women, respectively, without including country of origin dummies. In 
Regression 1, our model predicts y=0.8950, meaning the predicted probability of a man 
being employed according to this model is 89.50%, which leaves an overall 
unemployment rate of approximately 10.5%. Most explanatory variables are statistically 
significant, with the exception of our secondary education completed dummy and our 
cohort 1983-1992 and 1973-1982 dummies. These three variables are all negative but 
insignificant, and therefore we cannot draw decisive conclusions about their 
implications. All other variables, including the cohort 1993-2002 dummy, have 
significant and positive effects on employment likelihood. For men in this regression, 
pertaining to the most recent immigrant cohort increases their employment probability 
by 1.73% as compared to the base group of immigrants who arrived in 1972 or before.  
 Regression 2, which is the same as Regression 1 except for females instead of 
males, shows slightly different results. Its predicted probability of employment is 
y=0.9007, meaning the probability of a woman being employed is 90.07%. All of the 
independent variables are statistically significant except for the cohort 1983-1992 and 
1973-1982 dummy variables once again. However, other results were surprising. For 
women, primary, secondary, and university education have statistically significant 
negative effects, which is alarming and discouraging for women pursuing education to 
improve their employment prospects. In most developing countries, it is normal to 
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observe a U-shaped pattern in the relationship between female education and 
employment and labor force participation rates. Primary education tends to improve 
women's job prospects over illiteracy, but most of these jobs are low-skill jobs. While 
secondary education tends to not help women’s employment or labor force participation 
prospects significantly, university education may allow them to access better, higher-
skilled jobs.  
 On the contrary, our results show that each successive level of education 
worsens employment probabilities, with secondary education decreasing a woman’s 
employment probability by 6% and university education decreasing her probability by 
10%. At the time of our data, Chile’s economy had only recently become more robust 
and stable in the last decade, since Pinochet’s dictatorship did not end until 1990. 
Therefore, the labor market may have not yet caught up with changing labor force 
trends, such as more women entering the workforce. We see in Regressions 6 and 8 that 
labor force participation rates increase with each successive level of education; women 
with university degrees are 55% more likely to be in the labor force than those with less 
than a primary education. However, the labor market may not yet have adapted to this 
surge of educated women in the labor force, especially if firms are discriminatory and 
sexist and thus resistant to hiring women. Many immigrant women, especially Peruvian 
women, are highly educated in their countries of origin and therefore inclined to look 
for jobs to match their education background in Chile. Highly educated women will be 
the most reluctant to accept low-quality jobs, thus contributing to negative employment 
probabilities but positive labor force participation rates. More current data from decades 
after the 1990 return of democracy is necessary to corroborate this hypothesis and 
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observe if women’s return on education shows a more expected positive increase in 
employment prospects.  
Additionally, in Regression 2, the young child dummy variable has statistically 
significant positive effects on women’s employment probabilities, as do age and marital 
status. The 3.5% increase in women’s employment probabilities with a young child or 
young children is perhaps unexpected for women, since they are the traditional 
caretakers for newborns and young children. However, this result is better explained by 
Regressions 6 and 8, both of which show a negative young child effect on female labor 
force participation. Thus, the positive effect on employment makes more sense, 
recognizing that many women are not actively seeking employment with young 
children and therefore not included in the binary employed or unemployed sample. 
Women who are active in the labor force with young children may be especially 
desperate for work for financial reasons and especially willing part-time work, 
potentially explaining their increased employment probabilities. 
B. Regressions 3-4 (Table 6) 
 Regressions 3 and 4 are the same as Regressions 1 and 2 with the addition of 
country of origin dummy variables into the probit regressions. In the male regression, 
Regression 3, secondary education is once again negative and insignificant, as are the 
cohort 1983-1992 and 1973-1982 variables. Cohort 1993-2002 is positive but 
insignificant now. Many of the country of origin dummy variables are statistically 
insignificant as well, but Peru, Argentina, and Spain are all marginally significant. Peru 
and Spain are positive, increasing employment probabilities by 1.9% and 5.8% 
respectively and relative to the base group, while Argentina is negative, decreasing 
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employment probability by 2.1%. This result may seem surprising, because we expect 
Argentine immigrants to have equal if not better employment probabilities compared to 
other Latin American immigrants in Chile. Argentina and Chile traditionally have a 
more reciprocal relationship and more similar political, economic, and social 
characteristics when compared to other nearby countries. However, our base group for 
these countries of origin dummies is all other countries not included in the regression as 
dummy variables, which is primarily all of Asia and Africa. These coefficients—
including their signs—are all relative to this base group. As previously discussed in the 
“History of Migration and Migration Policy in Chile” section, Chile requires an 
employment contract in order to obtain a temporary work visa. This policy explains 
why we see universally better employment and labor force participation prospects for 
the most recently arrived immigrants in the cohort 1993-2002.  
This policy also inadvertently explains why Peruvians may seemingly see better 
employment probabilities than Argentines. Peruvian immigrants typically face more 
discrimination in Chilean society than Argentines do, due to more pronounced racial, 
ethnic, socioeconomic class, and cultural differences. Therefore, these contract laws for 
migrating workers are often more strictly enforced for Peruvian immigrants and those 
from other poorer countries, which are considered “less desirable” countries of origin 
by many Chileans. On the other hand, Argentines have a more reciprocal migratory 
relationship with Chile and are more likely to fall into the temporary worker category, 
not just the stricter contract category. Temporary visas are given to more “beneficial” 
immigrants and these immigrants are not required to have a job lined up before 
migrating. Therefore, the seemingly contrary negative employment effect for 
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Argentines in particular may in fact be signaling a more cordial general relationship 
between the two countries.  
Regression 4 is similar to Regression 2 with the addition of the countries of 
origin dummy variables, predicting employment outcomes for women in Chile. Once 
again, all levels of education show negative and statistically significant effects on 
employment. Belonging to the most recent immigrant cohort, arriving in the years 1993 
to 2002, is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. In contrast with 
Regression 3, Regression 4 shows most of the country of origin dummy variables as 
statistically significant, with the exception of Bolivia, the United States, and Germany. 
While the Argentina and “other Latin American countries” dummies have negative 
effects, Peru and Spain continue to have statistically significant positive effects, as do 
Ecuador and other European countries.  
Table 6: Probit results with marginal effects (mfx) coefficients—employment rates 
Independent 
Variables 
(y=employed) 
Marginal effect coefficients 
Regression 1 
Males 
(N=682,767) 
Regression 2 
Females 
(N=336,189) 
Regression 3 
Males 
(N=682,767) 
Regression 4 
Females 
(N=336,189) 
Age .00112*** .00279*** .00112*** .00278*** 
Marital status .02509*** .00620*** .02508*** .00621*** 
Young child (0-5) .03537*** .00341** .03538*** .00345** 
Primary completed .00315*** -.02465*** .00315*** -.02472*** 
Secondary 
completed -.00059 -.06465*** -.00064 -.06502*** 
University 
completed .00680** -.10282*** .00673** -.10301*** 
Managers .08993*** .09139*** .08894*** .09148*** 
Professionals .08904*** .10052*** .08903*** .10069*** 
Technicians .06768*** .06669*** .06772*** .06703*** 
Clerks .08021*** .07228*** .08021*** .07254*** 
Service workers .06385*** .04933*** .06386*** .04962*** 
Agriculture/fishery 
(skilled) .07461*** .02894*** .07460*** .02917*** 
Craftspeople .03951*** .05454*** .03950*** .05472*** 
Factory workers .06789*** .05871*** .06790*** .05879*** 
Cohort 1993-2002 .01733*** .05336*** .01401* .02071** 
Cohort 1983-1992 -.00433 .00071 .00036 .00111 
Cohort 1973-1982 -.00854 .00035 -.00208 .01414 
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Peru n/a n/a .01928** .06448*** 
Argentina n/a n/a -.02112** -.04423*** 
Bolivia n/a n/a .00933 .00639 
Ecuador n/a n/a .01554 .03596** 
U.S.A n/a n/a .02330 .02278 
Spain n/a n/a .05809 .05384* 
Germany n/a n/a -.00080 .01224 
Other Latin 
American 
countries n/a n/a -.02081 -.03767*** 
Other European 
countries n/a n/a .01874 .03525* 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. Results without asterisks are statistically insignificant. 
 
C. Regressions 5-6 (Table 7) 
Regressions 5-8 are similar to Regressions 1-4 except Regressions 5-8 use labor 
force participation as the dependent variable instead of employment. The labor force 
participation dummy includes both employed and unemployed workers, as both are in 
the labor force, as well as inactive workers, who are not included in the “unemployed” 
category. In Regression 5, the male regression predicting labor force participation 
without country of origin dummies, all independent variables are statistically 
significant. Each level of education increases a man’s labor force participation 
probability, a finding that also makes sense. Primary education increases labor force 
participation probabilities by 4.3%; secondary education increases it by 9.0%; and 
university education increases it by 13.1%. In terms of employment outcomes, primary 
education only increases male employment probabilities by 0.3% and even university 
education only increases it by 0.6%. Belonging to all immigrant cohorts shows 
significant and negative effects on labor force participation. The most recent cohort 
(1993-2002) sees the probability of labor force participation decrease by 3.7%, while 
cohorts 1983-1992 and 1973-1982 see lower probabilities by 17% and 11%, 
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respectively. While this finding may not seem to make sense given previous results and 
migration policy, it may result from tied migrants, especially spouses, who move with 
their partner to Chile and only one of them works. This sample size is almost twice as 
large as those of Regressions 1-4, meaning it likely includes many immigrants’ spouses 
and family members that were not encapsulated by pure employment data. Moreover, 
the years of arrival are especially important for these immigrants. The 1983-1992 and 
1973-1982 immigrants all arrived during or almost during Pinochet’s dictatorship, 
resulting in historically low numbers of immigrants and distinct demographics, since 
leftists and socialists were fleeing Chile rather than entering it.   
Regression 6, which is specific to women, yields different results. Age once 
again has a significant coefficient, although small, as do the marital status and young 
child variables. The young child variable is the strongest of the three in terms of its 
effect magnitude. These results make sense, as gender norms dictate that women are 
more likely to stay at home to care for young children and less likely to need to work if 
married to a husband in the labor force. In this regression, the 1993-2002 cohort 
variable is positive and significant while the other cohort variables are negative. The 
1993-2002 cohort is 10.8% more likely to be in the labor force than those who 
immigrated before 1973, but cohorts 1983-1992 and 1973-1982 see a decrease in 
probabilities by 12.2% and 6.2%, respectively. The women in this most recent cohort 
migrated at the beginning of the shift in migratory trends. As discussed in the section on 
Peruvian migration, at the turn of the century Peruvian women—as well as Bolivian, 
Ecuadorian, and other women from nearby, poorer South American countries—began to 
migrate to Chile in unprecedented numbers to work in the aforementioned care industry. 
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Therefore, these more recent immigrants may see higher labor force participation rates 
relative to the base group of immigrants who arrived in 1972 or before.  
D. Regressions 7-8 (Table 7) 
In Regressions 7 and 8, we include country of origin dummies once again. In 
Regression 7, these country dummies are all negative and statistically significant, 
except for Ecuador, which is positive but insignificant, and Peru, which is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The most recent cohort dummy is also negative and 
statistically insignificant now. Regression 8 has similar results as Regression 6, but the 
added country dummies are particularly interesting. While many of them are negative 
and all are statistically significant, the effects are positive for Peru, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, all relatively poor and nearby countries. Peru is especially statistically 
significant, with a Z-value of 17.76 as opposed to the Z values of 3.06 and 2.86 for 
Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively. These findings all corroborate the budding care 
industry in Chile at the turn of the 21st century, as Chile’s economy began to grow once 
again after Pinochet’s dictatorship and nearby economies began to collapse, forcing 
workers to seek stability elsewhere. The Peruvian economy collapsed at the turn of the 
century as a result of Alberto Fujimori’s dictatorship, causing a massive wave of 
Peruvians to migrate to Chile in search of more economic and political stability. This 
historical context informs and explains the positive effects of recent migration and Peru 
as the country of origin for female immigrants specifically. As mentioned previously, 
one sign of an economy transitioning from developing to developed is the need for more 
caretakers as native women enter the workforce in greater numbers, which began to 
happen in Chile in the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, the timeline and the magnitude of 
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these effects make sense historically. The feminization of migration and the greater 
demand for female workers in the care industry may also explain the negative 
coefficients for male immigrants from Bolivia, as they may be tied migrants and 
immigrate with their spouse who is in the labor force, but employment for these men 
may be more difficult to find.  
Table 7: Probit results with marginal effects (mfx) coefficients—labor force 
participation rates 
 
Independent 
Variables 
(y=labor force 
participation) 
Marginal effect coefficients 
Regression 5 
Males 
(N=920,913) 
Regression 6 
Females 
(N=964,619) 
Regression 7 
Males 
(N=920,913) 
Regression 8 
Females 
(N=964,619) 
Age .00417*** .00244*** .00417*** .00245*** 
Marital status .12022*** -.02595*** .12014*** -.02600*** 
Young child (0-5) .20547*** -.07243*** .20543*** -.07236*** 
Primary 
completed .04304*** .09932*** .04306*** .09947*** 
Secondary 
completed .09045*** .34232*** .09062*** .34245*** 
University 
completed .13131*** .55216*** .13198*** .55308*** 
Cohort 1993-2002 -.03744*** .10866*** -.01440 -.00003 
Cohort 1983-1992 -.17012*** -.12184*** -.12602*** -.13992*** 
Cohort 1973-1982 -.11751*** -.06153*** -.07328*** -.07064*** 
Peru n/a n/a .05562*** .27552*** 
Argentina n/a n/a -.02579** .00637 
Bolivia n/a n/a -.03475** .05331*** 
Ecuador n/a n/a .00475 .10394*** 
U.S.A n/a n/a -.21061*** -.08820*** 
Spain n/a n/a -.09927** -.12301** 
Germany n/a n/a -.08518*** -.05783** 
Other Latin 
American 
countries n/a n/a -.11156*** -.03940*** 
Other European 
countries n/a n/a -.08431*** -.07647*** 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. Results without asterisks are statistically insignificant.  
 
Across all of these results, the marginal effect coefficients can only capture the 
net effect of various supply and demand factors associated with each specific variable. 
On the supply side, we see certain skillsets for immigrants from different countries and 
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different cohorts that are not directly accounted for by our independent variables, such 
as soft skills. On the demand side, we have national and firm-level policies that 
influence the model’s coefficients as well. While we have discussed national migration 
politics in Chile in earlier sections, firms can collectively influence labor market trends 
as well. For example, firms’ hiring policies, as well as any firm-level discrimination or 
preconceived stereotypes, influence our variable coefficients but are not captured by the 
model. These various supply and demand factors push and pull against each other, 
leaving us with only the net effect in the form of the marginal effect probit coefficients. 
Therefore, the full magnitude and scope of many variables may actually be more 
extreme than we see in the existing coefficients. Our null hypothesis states that there is 
no difference in employment patterns between native Chileans and immigrants across 
various cohorts, our statistically significant results allow us to reject the null, since 
certain cohorts and countries of origin see different employment and labor force 
participation probabilities.  
IX. Conclusion 
 
Our results show different employment and labor force participation 
probabilities based on year of immigration, country of origin, and gender. We see 
evidence of the nascent care industry in Chile through differences in male and female 
employment prospects with the same country of origin and decade of immigration, with 
a significant 6.4% increase in employment probability for Peruvian women and only a 
marginally significant 1.9% increase for Peruvian men (Table 6). We also see some of 
the implications of the contract visa system, with many recently-immigrated workers 
having better prospects of employment by necessity to obtain a Chilean visa in the first 
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place. Men in the most recent immigrant cohort (1993-2002) see a significant increase 
in employment probabilities by 1.7%, and women see an even greater increase by up to 
5.3% (Table 6). Employment and labor force participation probabilities decrease after 
this first cohort, perhaps due to different preferences and demographic characteristics 
but also perhaps to labor market discrimination that makes it difficult to find work after 
leaving the initial contract. Other results are disconcerting, such as the negative returns 
on each level of education for women’s employment probabilities; however, positive 
labor force participation probabilities indicate potentially changing trends as the country 
has developed further. Our low R2 values—around 0.058 for employment regressions 
and around 0.121 for labor force participation regressions—reveal the low predictive 
value of our models, likely due to many omitted variables. For example, due to 
collinearity problems we did not include a variable to account for education attained in 
Chile versus education attained abroad, even though education in Chile would likely be 
a better predictor of employment outcomes since it is a more reliable signal for Chilean 
employers. Other demographic characteristics such as a more detailed breakdown of 
race and ethnicity would be useful, as well as province of residence in Chile to analyze 
regional differences in employment outcomes. Moreover, we cannot draw conclusions 
about immigrant employment outcomes over time since we did not include interaction 
variables to interact the cohort and age variables for immigrants.  
While we only had employment data available through the Chilean census and 
not wage data, our study would pair nicely with wage analysis for the same 
demographic groups. Studying employment and wage patterns together would create a 
more complete economic picture of immigrant assimilation in Chile, both across and 
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between immigrant groups. However, obtaining wage data can prove difficult, 
especially in Latin America; due to high levels of tax evasion and tax fraud, census 
employees often avoid wage questions altogether to promote honesty and compliance. 
Furthermore, replicating our study with more recent census data would allow a better 
analysis of potential recent changes in employment patterns. Peruvian migration 
specifically has increased dramatically in the past decade, and Peruvians now constitute 
Chile’s largest immigrant population. Since our data set only began to capture this 
trend, studying Peruvian immigration in this recent context is necessary to understand 
the current face of migration in Chile, and the tools and methodology employed by our 
study will lend themselves nicely to reapplication when more data becomes available. 
Additionally, the Chilean population is much smaller than the U.S. population—
17 million as opposed to 318 million—and the countries’ respective immigrant 
populations are even more distinct. While Chile has been experiencing substantial 
migration, especially in recent years, its emigrant stock still remains higher than its 
immigrant stock historically. According to the OECD World Migration Report, the 
United States is one of the only countries in the world that receives more immigrants 
than emigrants leaving the country, and thus its positionality in immigration policy is 
unique and distinctive. While Chile is currently receiving immigrants at an 
unprecedented rate, Pinochet’s relatively recent dictatorship continues to shape the 
country’s migration politics. During Pinochet’s regime, many Chileans went into exile 
abroad, but the country’s recent economic prosperity has made it a newly popular 
migration destination for South Americans and other immigrant groups.  
 	 41 
Moreover, our study specifically cannot account for the migration and 
employment patterns of undocumented immigrants. While these immigrants are likely 
included in our data set, we have no way to distinguish them. Estimates show that Chile 
likely received 15,000 to 20,000 undocumented immigrants, specifically from Peru and 
Bolivia, at the turn of the 21st century, but using official census data keeps these 
immigrants invisible and removed from the discussion. Although 20,000 is a small 
estimate compared to countries like the United States, the presence of undocumented 
immigrants has important policy implications in Chile. In 1998, under President 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the Chilean government offered temporary visas to 
undocumented Peruvian and Bolivian immigrants, but the process was time and cost 
intensive and the uptake was low. In 2007, President Michelle Bachelet granted 
amnesty that afforded legal status to 50,000 immigrants, but this amnesty was merely a 
temporary solution. A more permanent and more extensive regularization process is not 
yet in place, but regularization could help with economic integration by allowing 
immigrants to fully capitalize on their skills without the need to hide and to remain 
under the often oppressive contract of their original employer.   
Future analysis will require more longitudinal studies and a wide variety of 
measures of immigrant integration and assimilation. Even so, assimilation may not be 
the goal in many cases. In other words, immigrants may not want to completely 
assimilate to their host country for a variety of reasons, so as to not lose their language 
or culture. Our results show employment convergence, and in some cases, even better 
employment outcomes for recent immigrant cohorts than for native Chileans, which has 
positive implications for immigrants’ economic assimilation. However, older cohorts 
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have lower employment and labor force participation probabilities, potentially 
elucidating a lack of comprehensiveness in assimilation and integration. Even for the 
more recent immigrant cohort for which we see employment and labor force 
participation convergence, they may still face barriers to integration due to xenophobia, 
racism, or both, and our research cannot account for the full effects of discrimination. 
Our study uses economic assimilation through employment convergence as the 
measurement aim, but we recognize the need for other studies with different objectives 
and metrics to create a more complete picture of immigrant experiences. Nonetheless, 
our results provide important information for economists, policymakers, and the general 
public. Our results capture the beginning of the new wave of immigrants at the turn of 
the century that has continued to present-day, thus solidly reaffirming the need for a 
new comprehensive migration policy in Chile to update the outdated 1975 Immigration 
Act. 
Since our results show different returns to intellectual capital and prevalent 
gender differences, policymakers can target more specific outcomes than general 
immigrant assimilation. For example, education should not decrease a woman’s 
employment probability; this result should be further investigated and addressed 
accordingly, possibly through gender-based affirmative action programs to equalize 
women’s chances. By providing an in-depth analysis of the differences in employment 
patterns between immigrant groups and native Chileans, we provide new labor market 
analysis. We see that there are significant differences in employment and labor force 
outcomes across native Chileans and immigrants and thus, while we see immediate 
employment convergence, we do not observe it sustainably in the long run. The most 
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recent immigrant cohort consistently sees an improved employment rate, but all older 
cohorts have lower employment probabilities. Findings like these necessitate further 
analysis and potential policy changes to examine root causes and to assist with labor 
market integration and immigrant assimilation, if assimilation is, in fact, the goal.  
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